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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: THREE CONCEPTS
OF EQUALITY
John J. Donohue III*
Over the past fifty years, the body of law prohibiting discrimination in employment has grown enormously in terms of the extent of
geographic coverage, the range of covered employers, the array of
protected workers, and the spectrum of prohibited practices. Beginning in the mid-1940s, states began passing Fair Employment
Practices laws that generally prohibited discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, or national origin. Over the next two
decades, the geographic reach of these laws .spread as most states
outside the South enacted some form of this legislation. With the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the legal prohibition became national in scope and the categories of protected
workers were extended to include women. In successive years,
more employers came within the regulatory domain of Title VII as
the required number of workers in a covered firm dropped from
one hundred to fifteen,2 and in 1972 Congress extended the reach
of the law to state and local government and educational institutions.3 Then, in the mid-1970s, the prohibition against racial discrimination was extended to all employers through the Supreme
Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 4 which interpreted the century-old 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as providing a remedy for racial discrimination that was independent of Title VII and therefore not bound
by the latter's exemption of small employers.
* Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Research
Fellow, American Bar Foundation. B.A. 1974, Hamilton; J.D. 1977, Harvard; M.A. 1982,
M.Phil. 1984, Ph.D. (Economics) 1986, Yale. - Ed. The author thanks Peter Siegelman for
his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 stat. 241, 253-66 (establishing
incremental implementation of the Act with 100 employees as the statutory minimum the
first year, 75 the second, 50 the third, and 25 thereafter); Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(2), 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04 (lowering the statutory minimum from 25 to 15 to be effective one year after enactment).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(2) 3, 86 Stat.
103, 103-04 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1).
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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Prior to 1971, employment discrimination laws had banned only
intentional discrimination. But in the first Supreme Court case interpreting Title VII, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 5 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, extended the reach of the
law through the novel formulation of the disparate impact doctrine
- which prohibited the application of neutral employment practices that generated adverse effects upon the protected classes specified in Title VII, absent a showing that the practices were justified
by business necessity. Since then, subsequent decisions and legislative enactments have banned an array of diverse practices - ranging from actuarially based pension plans6 and exclusions of
childbirth expenses from employer health insurance plans7 to sexual harassment8 - that were not at first seen as discriminatory. In
addition, the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,9 the Americans with Disabilities Act,10 and a large array of
state and local employment discrimination laws that are more expansive than Title VII11 has greatly broadened the number of workers falling into some protected category.
One might suppose that the burgeoning corpus of employment
discrimination law reflects a consensus that this form of regulation
has been working well and should be expanded. But the contentious and protracted struggle among the Supreme Court, Congress,
and the Bush administration that culminated in the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 as well as the growing academic debate
over the appropriate scope of employment discrimination law, belie
this view. There are deep disagreements about whether the country
would be best served by a reduction or an intensification of the
legal attack on employment discrimination. This essay attempts to
provide a conceptual framework with which one can assess both the
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
7. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)), overturned the Supreme Court's decision in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which had permitted discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy.
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988)).
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (Supp.
III 1991)).
11. Although federal law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or against cigarette smokers, many state and local governments do. See infra notes 14,
16.
12. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp.
III 1991)).
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enormous transformations of employment discrimination law and
the continuing disagreements over its proper scope. The thrust of
the argument is that the initial creation and subsequent growth of
employment discrimination law has been generated by the development over time of a richer conception of the demands of equality,
while the antagonism between the contending parties is ai least in
part explained by differences concerning which version of equality
best describes the modern labor market.
The essay begins with a discussion of which groups deserve the
protection of employment discrimination law. With the protected
categories of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act etched into the
American consciousness, many might consider the appropriate categories to be fully self-evident. But of course, they are not, and
many jurisdictions continue to struggle over whether certain dispreferred groups merit the law's solicitude.
Over time, three different conceptions of equality have influenced the development of employment discrimination law. Before
World War II, the nation's willingness to accept the outcomes generated by competitive labor markets was premised on an implicit
conception of equality - namely, that a worker's wage should
equal the market-determined value of the individual's labor. I refer
to this concept of equality as "contingent equality" because a
worker's value often depended on the degree of discrimination
against a particular group of workers - and therefore was contingent on attitudes about the worker and not just on his work. As
Part II discusses, there is a distinction between the equality one can
expect from a competitive labor market and the greater degree of
equality that is generated by a more perfectly competitive market
such as an efficient capital market. Capital markets ensure that the
price of assets will equal their value even in the presence of severe
bias or discriminatory attitudes on the part of investors. The capital
market equates price not with mere contingent value but with intrinsic value and in this sense guarantees "intrinsic equality." The
initial goal of employment discrimination law was to provide intrinsic equality, which the free labor market could not deliver, to the
enumerated protected classes. But while a consensus has emerged
that intrinsic equality is a desirable goal for protected workers,
there is significant disagreement regarding both the extent to which
intrinsic equality has already been achieved and the degree to
which the goal itself is adequate. A richer notion of equality, which
I refer to as "constructed equality," has motivated much of the
growth of employment discrimination law in an effort to go beyond
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the protections that even a perfectly competitive market would
afford.
·
Part III illustrates that the early civil rights movement sought to
achieve the equivalent of intrinsic equality for black workers; the
goal was to have black workers receive what would be the true
value of their labor in a nondiscriminatory environment. Some of
the principled opponents of antidiscrimination law in the early
1960s based their opposition on the view that intrinsic equality already existed. Many of the principled opponents of today believe
that intrinsic equality has now been achieved and thereby deny the
continued need for legal intervention in labor markets to protect
female and minority workers. Yet, while the labor market has tendencies pushing in the direction of intrinsic equality, there is likely
to be a significant difference between contingent equality - which
is all that workers can hope for without government intervention and intrinsic equality.
Part IV shows that although women, the elderly, and the disabled at first embraced the quest for intrinsic equality, the closer
they have come to achieving it the more they have sought to reject
it as the goal of employment discrimination law. Law increasingly
seeks and requires a higher degree of equality - "constructed
equality." Rather than compelling employers to pay protected
workers the true value of their productivity by equating wages and
intrinsic value, the demand is to have employers make workers
equal. Although the market was often an ally - albeit at times an
inconsistent one - of the quest for intrinsic equality for protected
workers, the market cannot achieve constructed equality. In fact,
the market relentlessly opposes it.

I.

WHO DESERVES SPECIAL PROTECTION?

Employm~nt

discrimination laws forbid employers from considering various attributes - such as race, sex, religion, or national
origin - in making employment decisions. This formal command
to disregard particular characteristics of workers is based on the
premise that bearers of these characteristics should be treated
equally with members of some favored comparison group who lack
these traits - perhaps white males under the age of forty. But who
deserves special protection? The State of Israel prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex but not on the basis of religion. 13 Do the
13. See Employment {Equal Opportunities) Law, 5741-1981 {1981), 35 LAWS OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 350 (authorized translation from the Hebrew prepared at the Israel Ministry of Justice).

August 1994]

Three Concepts of Equality

2587

unique religious tensions that exist in that country argue in favor of
or against the exclusion of religion from the list of protected categories? Some state and local jurisdictions in the United States have
prohibited discrimination against gays,14 overweight individuals,1s
and cigarette smokers,16 while others have rejected these claims.
Defining the appropriate characteristics of workers that merit the
special solicitude of employment discrimination law is not a simple
task. Yet this process of definition is an important one, because
every expansion of the categories to he given special consideration
carries the risk of diluting the protections afforded to the groups
already defined.17
The problem is particularly difficult because numerous factors
appear relevant to the determination of protected classes, and in
many cases the factors offer conflicting signals. For example, at first
glance, it seems relatively unobjectionable that older workers
should be given special protection. We help the elderly across
roads and we give them special seating on public transportation, so
why not give them a little break in the work arena? Perhaps surprisingly, though, the large majority of cases brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act - and the cases resulting in the
largest awards by far of all employment discrimination suits - are
brought by white, male professionals and managers.1 8 This is not a
14. Eight states and over 100 municipalities prohibit discrimination in employment on the
basis of sexual orientation. Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men:
A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POLY.
Rev. 47, 63 (1993).
15. California law protects from employment discrimination overweight individuals who
can establish on the basis of medical evidence that their excessive weight was the result of a
physiological condition affecting one or more basic bodily symptoms and limiting a major life
activity. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). Michigan is the only
state that has codified a prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of
weight. M1cH. CoMP. LAWS§ 37.2102 (1979). See generally Comment, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be a Protected Classification?, 30
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 951 (1990).
'")
16. For examples, see John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. Rev. 1583, 1614 n.147 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
{1992)), and the sources cited therein.
17. This problem was highlighted in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979), in which female job candidates were severely disadvantaged by laws providing preferences to veterans.
18. Seventy-three percent of ADEA cases in which no other claim of discrimination was
raised - that is, pure ADEA cases - and in which race and gender w~re identifiable from
case files were brought by white males, and 67% were filed by managers and professionals.
The average monetary judgment per plaintiff was $135,574 in pure ADEA cases and $15,206
in non-ADEA cases. For a discussion of the data set from which these calculations were
made, see John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 983 {1991).
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class of individuals that one normally would consider to be in need
of special legal protections.
Even groups with seemingly unassailable claims for privileged
treatment can possess characteristics that at least raise the question
whether the goal of equality, when broadly considered, is furthered
by such privileged treatment. The reason for this counterintuitive
speculation is that it is possible for a group to be somewhat disadvantaged in the labor market - and thus, from this narrow perspective, legitimately entitled to special protections - but at the
same time relatively advantaged in other measures of well-being.
In such cases it is conceivable that the attainment of equality in the
labor market without equality in other spheres important to human
well-being might actually undermine a more broadly conceived notion of equality of human well-being. One might think of this proposition as a form of the "Theory of Second Best" applied to the
concept of equality.19
This possibility may be illustrated by an examination of the
United Nation's Human Development Report,20 which seeks to
evaluate how various countries succeed in enhancing the human potential of their citizens and in creating an environment that enables
the full use of human capabilities. The consultant on the United
Nations project was the famed economist Amartya Sen, who developed a Human Development Index (HDI) based on longevity, educational attainment, and access to resources, designed to measure
"people's ability to live a long and healthy life, to communicate and
to participate in the life of the community and to have sufficient
resources to obtain a decent living."21 While in many ways the rank
order of various countries according to this Human Development
Index accords with one's intuitions, the most surprising finding is
that on this measure of human well-being, white women in America
- the primary beneficiaries of sex discrimination law - come out
ahead of not only every other demographic group in the United
States but also the citizens of every other country in the world. 22
19. The well-known Theory of Second Best teaches that when multiple market imperfec•
tions exist, the elimination of any single market imperfection may actually lower total social
welfare. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956-1957). More broadly, the theory can be thought of as implying that
when one is dealing with a large and interdependent problem - such as the pursuit of equal·
ity in the complex modem world - optimizing the solution to only one component part of
the problem may actually make the overall problem worse.
20. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993 (1993),
21. Id. at 104.
22. Id. at 18.

August 1994]

Three Concepts of Equality

2589

This finding is particularly surprising because Sen in part devised the index out of his concern for the poor treatment of women
throughout the world.23 Nonetheless, white women in the United
States stand at the top of the list with an HDI value of about 1.0,
while white males in the United States, with an HDI value of only
approximately 0.975, are surpassed by the citizens of Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden.24 By comparison, black females have an HDI of only about 0.9, which puts them on a par
with the citizens of Greece, and black males have an HDI just
above 0.85, placing them at about the level of the citizens of Bulgaria.25 Of course, simply having the longest life-span, the most education, and considerable access to resources does not establish the
attractiveness of the lives of a particular group, and there are obvious shortcomings in the Human Development Index.26 But it does
suggest that the numerically largest protected class of workers white women - compares quite well on a number of important
dimensions of well-being, not only in relation to other protected
classes of workers, but also in relation to the presumably favored
comparison group of white men.
While the Human Development Index may offer a counterintuitive perspective on the relative status of white women, it strongly
buttresses the conventional view that black Americans enjoy a far
lower degree of well-being than white Americans, even after the
substantial gains that occurred following the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Certainly, at the time of the debate over this
Act in the early 1960s, black Americans had an exceptionally strong
claim to the solicitude of federal employment discrimination law,
23. Sen's most arresting finding was that owing to poor treatment of women, infanticide,
and selective abortion, there were perhaps 100 million women missing in the world from the
numbers one would expect if women and girls were treated equally with men. Id. at 25.
24. Compare id. at 11 tbl. 1.1 with id. at 18 fig. 1.13.
25. Id. at 18 fig. 1.13.
26. For each dimension of the HDI - longevity, educational attainment, and access to
resources - a value is calculated ranging from 0 to 1. The HDI is the equal-weighted average of these three numbers, which can therefore range from a low of 0 to a high of 1. American women surpass American men by 10% in terms of longevity and by 2% in terms of
education but fall below them in terms of income. Id. at 196. The index is computed in such
a way that increases in income that are substantially above the poverty threshold have a
decreasingly proportional impact on the HDI. Thus, at the high levels of income of both
American men and women in comparison with world income figures, the income shortfall of
American women receives less weight in the HDI than the advantages that American women
enjoy in life-span and education. Thus, despite the Development Report's position that "the
HDI is particularly well-suited to examining gender inequalities" and that "[a] constant concern in constructing the HDI has been to preserve its universality - to retain a single index
for both the rich and poor countries," there are reasons for caution in using it to examine
gender disparities within the wealthiest nations. Id. at 111.
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for not only had they experienced the egregious oppression of slavery for over two hundred years prior to 1865, but they also suffered
from enormous public and private discrimination, hostility, and violence for the next one hundred years, coupled with substantial relative economic deprivation. Without question, American blacks,
most conspicuously in the South, were earning less for their labor
than otherwise identical white workers were earning, and this was a
major source of inequality that Title VII was designed to redress.
I have alluded to the multidimensional growth in the body of
employment discrimination law over the last fifty years, and this
Part has examined some of the issues that arise along the single
dimension of determining which groups should be protected. But
in turning now to a discussion of the progressive demands of what
"equality" requires, one must keep in mind that as society attempts
to provide protected groups with increasingly more than a freemarket allocation would render, the conflict between who deserves
protection and how much protection they get can become acute. In
the extreme case, affirmative action for all becomes affirmative action for no one.
II.

PRICE AND VALUE

Because southern blacks in the early 1960s earned dramatically
less than the benchmark group of otherwise identical southern
white workers,27 one can conclude that southern blacks were earning less than their "true value." But because wages are simply the
price paid to labor, and because one of the hallmarks - indeed the
very defining characteristic - of a competitive market is that price
equals value, we are confronted with something of an anomaly.28
Either the southern labor market was not competitive, in which
case it is not particularly surprising that the price paid to black labor did not equal its value,29 or, more plausibly, it was broadly competitive but the "value" of black workers did not equal the "value"
of the otherwise identical white workers.
27. See generally John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 1603 (1991).
28. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 11 (4th ed. 1991) ("[I]f there is a good market for an asset, its value is exactly the
same as the market price.").
29. Richard Epstein believes that the southern labor market was not competitive because
of interference by racist governmental restrictions. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 244-54.
While Epstein may be correct, the evidence in support of this claim is somewhat limited.
Donohue, supra note 16, at 1594.
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In order to address this apparent anomaly, it may be helpful to
elaborate on the concept of a perfectly competitive market. As I
noted above, a perfectly competitive market is one in which the
value of an asset equals its price. Perhaps the best illustration of
such a market is the market for financial securities. Here the
hallmarks of perfect competition are most in evidence: all the
shares of a given company's stock are perfectly fungible, and millions of investors and money managers spend much time and effort
trying to ascertain the true value of these shares. Moreover, when
investors perceive any divergence between value and price, they
can buy or sell the under- or overvalued security very quickly in a
trading market that has very low transaction costs.
A. Perfectly Competitive Markets and Intrinsic Equality
These features of modem capital markets imply that there will
be a strong tendency for price and value to be equal. If the price of
a capital asset, such as a financial security, is below its true value, a
host of offers to purchase will tend to elevate the price to the point
at which the price-value discrepancy is eliminated. Conversely, if
the price of an asset lingers above the true value, the downward
pressures on price ,operate quickly as owners of the asset try to sell
it. Even nonowners can facilitate the rapid price drop toward the
true value through the use of short sales. With so much at stake in
discerning whether price equates with value~ with only a few thousand stocks that need to be valued, with tens of thousands of analysts spending all their time trying to ascertain this value, and with
the fantastic volume of stock trading that provides at very low cost
virtually constant updates on the latest assessment of value by
knowledgeable market participants, the stock market is unparalleled in the degree to which it approximates the perfectly competitive market.3°
Consider the situation in which someone tries to sell authentic
$20 bills to the highest bidders. Tue demand curve for such $20
bills would be perfectly horizontal (elastic), because no one would
pay more than $20 to receive such a bill, and if buyers could
purchase the bill at anything less than $20, the quantity demanded
would become infinite. Even if a large majority of buyers have
some personal reason that keeps them from purchasing the $20
bills, there will certainly be more than enough demand to bid up the
30. Stephen A. Ross, The Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Theoretical Perspectives, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1987, at 29, 30 ("[F]inancial markets are extremely liquid and as
close to our purely competitive ideal as one can find in the real world.").
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price of the bills should it slip below $20. The intuition behind this
example explains why "[t]he conventional wisdom among legal
scholars and financial economists is that demand for stock (as well
as other securities) is horizontal."31 Although the task of valuing
corporate securities is not as trivial as that of valuing paper currency, securities analysts do a good enough job in this enterprise to
make the analogy a useful one.
The implication of this discussion is that there is little need to
fear the problem of the undervaluing of a corporate security. The
owner of a corporate security can sell the security at a price equaling its value even if a great number of individuals were for some
reason "prejudiced" against the owner or the particular corporation. Investors in capital markets are interested only in the
nondiversifiable risk and the expected returns for differing securities, and they tend to price securities accordingly. One confirmatory piece of evidence on this score is that there is no call for
government regulation - other than a requirement that relevant
information possessed by the management of firms whose securities
trade in the organized securities markets be disclosed in a timely
fashion - to assure that price and value are equated.
One point in particular should be underscored. The existence of
irrational biases or prejudices on the part of investors does not prevent capital markets from ensuring that price equals value. One
might suppose that this statement tells more about the relative lack
of prejudice in investors than about the ability of capital markets to
equalize price and value. Proponents of this view would argue that
while there is much in the real world and the social psychological
literature to suggest that some Americans harbor strong prejudices
- at times, rising to the level of intense hatred - against blacks or
women or other identifiable categories of workers, there is little
reason to think that such emotions are aroused by sterile assets like
corporate securities. But this view underestimates the passions and
biases of investors and overlooks the institutional features of capital
markets that tend to eradicate their influence over price. To begin
with, because trading takes place through brokers on an organized
exchange, most investors would never be in a position to know who
the previous owner of a corporate security was, and therefore there

31. Richard Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping
Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187, 1187 {1993).
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would be no opportunity to avoid purchasing or selling a particular
stock, say, because one did not like its prior or prospective owner.32
Moreover, even if many investors find a certain company or
product distasteful, the shares of that company's stock should still
trade at full value. It is undoubtedly the case that significant numbers of investors have biases against holding certain actively traded
securities. Some may feel that Dow Chemical should be shunned
because it manufactured napalm during the Vietnam War. There
are no doubt large numbers of investors who believe that gambling
is wrong and therefore avoid purchasing the stock of casino enterprises, or who believe that tobacco companies are the merchants of
death and therefore avoid purchasing their stocks, or who shunned
the stocks of companies investing in preliberation South Africa.
Others may simply shun stocks altogether because of memories or
fears of the stock crash or for some other reason.
Furthermore, some investors may avoid certain stocks, not out
of a sense of personal or political distaste, but rather from erroneous beliefs about the future profitability of certain companies or
particular enterprises. Some may believe that video laser disks represent the technology of the future even though videotapes have
almost completely displaced them. But as long as the market is perfectly competitive and a sufficiently large number of other investors
are concerned only with the risk and return of financial assets, the
auction quality of these markets should bid up the price of these
assets to their full value. In other words, because there are enough
investors who care only about maximizing profits and who can
quickly and cheaply purchase any undervalued securities, prejudice
against a security owner or a company simply cannot cause the
price of a security to diverge from its value. These biases do not
pose a concern to issuers of stock or to those who own stock because millions of investors are trying to ascertain the value of a security, and others who do not carry biases against the particular
stock will be happy to step in to fill the void if the stock can be
purchased at a price below its value.
32. Obviously, not all sales of assets are shielded from the effects of discrimination. Consider, for example, the studies documenting discrimination in the sales of houses and
automobiles. See, e.g., Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of
Whites From Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 AM.
Soc. REv. 23, 33 (1994); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991). Moreover, for a vivid depiction of the
apparent satisfaction that a biased and unoccupied shoe salesman could obtain from refusing
to acknowledge the existence of a black customer, see Primetime Live: True Colors (ABC
television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1991).
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But confidence that the market will assure the equality of value
and price does not extend to all markets. Indeed, the very existence
of employment discrimination law would seem to reflect the enormous concern over precisely this question in labor markets. Consequently, one of the major goals of the civil rights movement and the
women's movement was to achieve a federal guarantee that the
wages of workers in certain protected classes equaled the value of
what those workers would produce in a perfectly competitive and nondiscriminatory - market.
Note that the appended qualification that the market be nondiscriminatory was deemed superfluous in the case of capital markets.
Price equaled value in that context even if many investors were
highly prejudiced. But this statement cannot always be made in less
efficient markets. For example, the typical southern black in 1955
had no expectation of being able to sell his labor at a price equaling
its value in a nondiscriminatory environment. Indeed, the widespread exclusion of blacks from certain enterprises and occupations
implicitly offered a price of zero for the labor of black workers
when there is little doubt that the value of black labor far exceeded
this amount.33 In other words, for a very extended period of time,
blacks and women felt that they could not rely on the protections of
the market to ensure that they would be hired and paid their true
value. This fundamental fact explains much of the focus of the civil
rights movement on securing the passage of legislation prohibiting
discrimination in employment: the goal was to assure that the price
that protected workers received for their labor was equal to the
value of their labor in the American economy, so long as value was
determined only with respect to intrinsic productivity and was not
distorted by discriminatory preferences of employers, fellow workers, or customers.
When employers, fellow workers, or customers shun certain
protected workers for certain jobs, they impose social costs even
apart from the depressing of wages of the dispreferred group. Such
sligllts can in themselves cause psychological pain; indeed, the very
reason members of one group might discriminate is to secure some
gain in self-esteem at the expense of the other group.34 But for
now, I want to leave this issue aside and focus only on the question
33. For example, blacks were widely excluded from the southern textiles industry for 50
years prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See James J. Heckman & Brook S.
Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status
of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 138 (1989).
34. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 1995).
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of the equality of price and value, or the lack thereof. Why do labor markets fall so short of what capital markets seem to deliver?
There are two reasons. First, labor markets are far less efficient
markets than capital markets, and as one departs from the features
of a perfectly competitive market, the forces that equate price and
value weaken. Persistent and substantial divergences between price
and value can exist in imperfect markets. Second, at best labor
markets can only be expected to equate price with the value of labor as determined not simply by the intrinsic value of the assets as
in capital markets but by the contingent assessment that will be influenced by an array of discriminatory participants. Put differently,
labor markets can only hope to achieve contingent equality, while
capital markets can deliver the higher ideal of intrinsic equality. I
will discuss each of these points in turn.
B. Labor Markets Are Not as Efficient as Capital Markets
Capital markets possess a number of attributes that make them
unusually efficient. There are a relatively small number of traded
equity securities in the United States, and for any given company,
all the shares of that company's stock are identical. Moreover, at
any particular point in time, everyone knows or at very small cost
can learn the price of a stock, as this information is generated
through the public stock exchanges. At the same time, because
substantial profits can be made from identifying mispriced stocks, a
large number of financial analysts and investors are continually trying to ascertain the true value of these stocks. Moreover, once an
investor has identified an undervalued stock, he can possess that
stock in a matter of minutes by incurring a relatively low transaction cost. In other words, in capital markets, there are only a relatively small number of prices to get right, and there are huge
rewards from doing just that. Consequently, analysts and investors
spend a great deal of time and effort trying to ascertain the correct
prices of securities, and for little more than the price of a phone call
and a small commission, they can almost immediately purchase any
undervalued security they identify.· ·
None of these attributes are characteristic of labor markets.
There are over 130 million workers in the U.S. labor force,35 and
each one is different. For the vast majority of jobs, there is relatively little at stake in accurately assessing the true value of any
single worker, and there is little or no publicly available informa35. 1994
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tion about the current salaries or productive abilities of workers.
This means that relatively few individuals are in a position to ascertain whether a worker is receiving a wage that is less than his value,
and thus few will be interested in doing so. Moreover, even among
those who are interested, such as prospective employers, there are
limits on how much they will be willing to spend to determine the
true productivity of workers because the gains from acquiring such
information on any single worker are apt to be relatively modest.
One might think that labor markets have one benefit over capital markets in that workers themselves advertise their availability
for work and therefore give employers the ability to learn at low
cost of the existence of valuable and underpaid workers. But there
are two reasons why the behavior of workers and applicants does
not improve the performance of labor markets vis-a-vis capital markets. First, while workers do not need to wait to be found but can
take the initiative in contacting prospective employers, this conduct
adds a new dimension of noise to the search process. All workers
are trying to signal their availability and talents; this raises the
transaction costs of those who must sift through the information
and obscures the signal emerging from the desirable workers. Second, while an important difference between capital and labor markets is that laborers, unlike stock certificates, are alive and able to
communicate, this difference does not provide an informational advantage to labor markets because the owner of stock has the same
incentives to trumpet its value as does the owner of labor.
Even if undervalued workers can be identified, it is not always a
simple matter to hire them. The worker may be living on the other
side of the country, and family connections may impede the easy
ability of the worker to move to the highest bidder. Even if a
worker is willing to move to a higher-paying job, transaction costs
may still be high. For example, assume that because of widespread
discrimination, firms in the South in 1960 were unwilling to hire
black workers at a wage equal to their productive value, but that
firms outside the South, in states where employment discrimination
laws were then widely in place, were less discriminatory. This assumption would be consistent with the data showing that the wage
penalty for blacks outside the South was far smaller than it was in
the South.36 These data suggest that black workers might have
been able to receive a wage more closely approximating the value
of their work by simply leaving the South. Of course, such a move
36. See Donohue & Heckman, supra note 27, at 1610.
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would have entailed both the monetary costs of relocating and the
nonmonetary costs of uprooting one's life and leaving family and
friends behind. For many individuals, these costs were not insurmountable, and in fact large numbers of young black men fled the
South during the twenty-five-year period before the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.37 But these costs were quite burdensome for
others, which may explain why the large wage penalties for blacks
living in the South persisted for such a long duration when moving
to jobs outside the South would have elevated black wages considerably.38 The fact that it was primarily young black men who left
the South suggests that the option to circumvent discrimination by
moving may be more costly for married workers whose spouses
might then have to change jobs as well.
These factors highlight the differences between the capital and
labor markets. There are lots of investors who are eagerly looking
for underpriced securities, and those securities are quickly snatched
up if they are found. There are no unemployed stock certificates.
In capital markets, any investor can profit from recognizing overvalued stocks through the device of short selling, but in labor markets only a current employer can benefit from recognizing an
overvalued worker - by firing the worker or by reducing her compensation, both of which may be costly. Labor markets are much
less supple and equilibrate more slowly, leaving workers who have
limited geographic or occupational mobility with little recourse
from the market for avoiding local discrepancies between the value
and the price of their labor. While there is only one market for
corporate securities in this country, there are thousands of labor
markets. Thus, discrepancies between price and value in the labor
market, which can be eliminated through the costly migration of
labor, cannot be eradicated as quickly or as cheaply as similar discrepancies in capital markets.
Richard Epstein has argued that the cause of the divergence between black wages and black productivity that existed in the South
was that the market was plagued by racist governmental restrictions
and the fear of private violence and thus was not truly competitive.39 But even if Epstein's argument is correct, which is by no
37. Id.
38. An alternative explanation might be that black wages as measured in the South were
understated because a significant portion of black income came from in-kind benefits to agricultural laborers. Under this view, the increase in measured wealth that could have been
achieved if blacks had moved out of the South would overstate the gain in real income.
39. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 246-54.
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means certain, it still underscores the difference between labor markets and capital markets. Even if no one in the South would buy
the stock of say, Ford Motor Company, it would still not dampen
the price of Ford stock. Northerners would simply buy more and
bid up the price to the true value. The same phenomenon would
not be true if all southerners refused to hire black workers. Absent
massive black out-migration or massive in-migration of unbiased
entrepreneurs that Epstein claims was blocked by government restrictions and violence, black wages would fall below the marginal
product of black labor.
The many differences between the two markets reveal that the
success of capital markets in equating price and value is an ideal
that labor markets might approach but never reach. In capital markets the high profits that are attainable through identifying divergences between price and value ensure that correct pricing of
individual securities will be the norm. In labor markets, by contrast, the relatively small value and high cost of determining worker
productivity ensures that employers will frequently find it profitable
not to determine the correct prices for individual workers. Instead,
employers often use cheap proxies such as race and sex to approximate true worker value. In other words, statistical discrimination
cannot exist in capital markets but can thrive in labor markets.
Unlike capital assets, labor assets - that is, workers - are not
mere passive investments; therefore, statistical discrimination will
likely distort workers' decisions with regard to investment in human
capital. If a member of a group knows that he will be treated as
though he possesses the average traits of all group members, he will
have no incentive to make investments that would increase his productivity. Thus, there may be an efficiency rationale for prohibiting
statistical discrimination against protected workers in labor markets,40 which Title VII clearly does.
Moreover, even though one would always expect capital markets to outperform labor markets in equating price and value, capital markets themselves have at times experienced substantial longterm deviations between price and value. As Peter Bernstein notes,
"An efficient market is not necessarily a rational market, nor is the
information it reflects always accurate. Investors in their enthusiasm, or in their collective gloom, sometimes agree among themselves that certain stocks are somehow worth more or less than
40. See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 340 (1983) (rebutting the common
presumption that equality-enhancing measures generally cause efficiency losses).
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their intrinsic values. "41 These deviations between price and value,
even in the relatively efficient capital market, can be remarkably
persistent. For example, over the past sixty-three years the returns
on small-company stocks have exceeded the returns on large-company stocks to a degree that is far greater than their higher risk can
explain.42 If substantial discrepancies between the price and value
of corporate securities, however unusual, can persist for long durations, it should hardly be surprising that extended deviations between the price and value of groups of workers can persist over
long periods of time.
C.

Contingent Value Versus Intrinsic Value

The value of a stock is determined by the discounted stream of
future earnings that will be conveyed to its owner. Thus, if one
knows the stream of expected earnings, one can determine the
stock's value by simply discounting with the appropriate discount
rate. The discount rate is asce_rtained through the application of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, which relies upon a proper estimation
of the firm's systematic risk, or "beta."43 Any two securities with
similar beta and expected return will trade at the same price. In
other words, one need look only at the intrinsic aspects of the security - its systematic risk and its expected return - to determine
its price. Contingent factors - the preferences of other parties operate only on the demand for the company's product and thus on
the stock's expected return, not on the price of the security once
that return has been established. Thus, if the demand for cigarettes
plummets because fewer individuals wish to smoke, the expected
returns to the owners of tobacco company stocks will fall. As those
expected returns fall, so will the price of the stock. But the price of
the stock will still exactly equal the value of any other asset that
41. PETER BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL
STREET 137 (1992).
42. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 296-97. This may not be a sign of a long-term
deviation between price and value if small stocks suffer some other defect, such as lack of
ready marketability, but the fact that much of the superior performance is concentrated during the first week of January would seem to undermine that speculation. As the authors of a
prominent textbook conclude: "It is difficult to imagine any reasonable model of equilibrium
consistent with the efficient-market hypothesis that could also be consistent with [these] results." STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 353 (2d ed. 1990).
43. Beta indicates how volatile a particular asset is compared with the overall market. A
stock with a beta of 1 would have the same nondiversifiable risk as the market as a whole and
would therefore have a discount rate equal to the expected return on the market. A stock
with a beta in excess of 1 would have greater nondiversifiable risk than the market portfolio
and would therefore have a higher discount rate. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 16169.
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generates a similar expected return with the same degree of systematic risk. Thus, the capital market overcomes the biases, prejudices,
and tastes of those who trade in capital markets; it does not overcome the biases, prejudices, and tastes of those who purchase the
products of a particular company.
In contrast, the price of labor is not determined entirely by the
intrinsic productivity of the worker. Rather, it will be determined
by a host of extrinsic factors, including the various preferences of
employers, fellow workers, and customers. In other words, one
cannot look only to a laborer's physical product to determine his
value; one must also look to the preferences of others with regard
to associating with that worker. If many fellow workers or customers are particularly drawn to a worker, his wage will be higher for
any given level of actual production. For example, if Mickey
Mantle and Willie Mays are baseball players of equal talent but fans
prefer to watch Mantle because he is white, Mantle may be expected to earn more in a competitive market. In other words, his
"value" is not simply determined by his baseball ability but also by
the effect he has on the audience. Put differently, his value is contingent upon the preferences of others and not on his intrinsic skills
as a batter and fielder.44
The major economic burden imposed by employment discrimination is the diver~ence between the price paid to certain classes of
labor and the true value of this labor. In other words, in a perfectly
competitive market with zero or low transaction costs, one would
not expect a divergence between; say, the wages of blacks and the
true productivity of blacks.45 A worker whose productivity substantially exceeds her wage will be in great demand. If the labor
market worked like the stock market, we would expect the price wage - of this worker to be bid up rather quickly until the divergence between price and value was eliminated. Thus, if the labor
market were as perfectly competitive as the stock market, there
44. Some evidence of such customer discrimination in baseball has been offered from an
analysis of the trading price of baseball cards. See Clark Nardonelli & Curtis Simon, Ct1s·
tomer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Memorabilia: The Case of Baseball, 105 QJ.
EcoN. 575 (1990). After controlling for measurable performance traits, the authors of the
study found that the cards of white baseball players traded at between 10% and 13% more
than baseball cards of nonwhite players. Id. at 594. What is true for baseball cards also
seems to be true in many professional sports: black athletes often seem to earn less than
their productivity would warrant. For references to studies demonstrating this phenomenon,
see Donohue, supra note 16, at 1608 n.122.
45. The qualification about transaction costs being close to zero is necessary to foreclose
the possibility of a situation - such as the one that existed in the pre-Tiile VII southern
labor market for blacks - in which those who hire black workers are quickly identified and
punished via some regime of informal, private sanctions.
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would be little to fear from discrimination and little need for the
law to try to add to the protection already provided by the market
- at least if society is content with providing intrinsic equality to its
workers. 46
In summary, modem capital markets ensure that the price of an
actively traded security will equal its value. Most importantly, this
statement is true regardless of whether or not many investors are
biased against holding the particular security. The security will
trade at the same price as if no investors were biased against it.
Although there are tendencies, perhaps even strong ones, pushing
the price of labor toward the value of labor, in every dimension
capital markets will necessarily do a better job of equating price
and value than labor markets will.
I

III.

THE GULF BETWEEN CONTINGENT EQUALITY AND
INTRINSIC EQUALITY

A. An Idealized Vision of Labor Markets
Thus far, we have focused on the equality between price and
value that one can hope to achieve in the capital market and suggested that this is at best an unattainable ideal to which the labor
market can only aspire. But if one considers the criticisms of employment discrimination laws by their primary principled opponents, it becomes clear that those opponents think of the labor
market as being as perfectly competitive as modem capital markets.
For example, in 1980 Senator Orrin Hatch wrote:
The EEOC has sometimes been credited with opening up new pools
of labor that corporations somehow contrived to ignore, and occasionally with hastening the breakdown of traditional barriers to labor
mobility. But in the context of the market's endless search for efficiency, these anomalies would have been eliminated anyway, leaving
only the question of whether they were worth the expenditures compelled by law. Affirmative action is a net cost to the economy....
46. One might point out that customer discrimination can lead to the undervaluing of
black workers, and the market will not root out such discrimination but rather will cater to it.
This is true because the labor market is not as perfectly competitive as the capital market and
therefore cannot guarantee intrinsic equality. If the labor market were as perfectly competitive as capital markets, black wages would not be depressed by customer discrimination because black workers would simply flow to jobs that did not involve customer contact. In such
a market, blacks would not suffer wage discrimination, although their freedom to pursue
customer-contact jobs would be impaired. In the actual labor-market world of contingent
equality, a worker bears the economic burden of trying to achieve intrinsic equality - perhaps by migrating to another area where nondiscriminatory employers are more abundant; in
the Title VII-induced effort to achieve intrinsic equality, the economic burden is shifted to
the employer. The employee can stay where she is, and the employer must pay her full
intrinsic value.

2602

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 92:2583

And the true dynamic effects - the opportunity cost of all this expense and effort, the diminution of competition, inefficiencies due to
the employment and promotion of marginal labor and the consequent
demoralization of good workers - can only be a matter of conjecture, although they are clearly the most important of all.47

A similar theme is echoed by one of the primary scholarly antagonists of employment discrimination law, Richard Epstein:
[Consider the example of two pools of labor] with substantial variations in each group, but where the quality of the worker drawn at
random in one group is known to be higher than in the other. . ..
When the quality of the workers in the less desired pool exceeds the
average quality of the remaining workers in the more desirable pool,
then hiring will migrate toward the second pool, notwithstanding the
original desire to remain with the preferred talent pool only....
Viewing it as a continuous ·process, one should see steady hiring from
both pools as firms seek the best available worker from any source.48

But thes~ descriptions of how employers will quickly take advantage of discrepancies between the value of workers and their
price focus only on the intrinsic productivity of the workers and
ignore the contingent value. In other words, this analysis much
more aptly describes how an investor would quickly buy up any undervalued stock than how an employer would contemplate hiring
when productivity is not clearly known and certain workers are dispreferred. In Hatch's terms, the market might contrive to ignore
certain categories of labor, not because of the intrinsic productivity
of this group of workers, but because of the preferences of relevant
actors to avoid this group. Moreover, Epstein's analysis of the
choice between hiring a preferred and dispreferred worker presupposes that employers would act on their preference in making their
employment decision only if the productivities of the dispreferred
and preferred workers were equal; otherwise, the most intrinsically
productive worker would be chosen. But intense discrimination
may prevent the employment of any worker from the less desirable
pool, regardless of intrinsic productivity. For example, it was not
that long ago that only whites could play major league baseball.
Certainly, there was a highly talented pool of labor that the market
had contrived to ignore, and no governmental restriction prevented
black players from being hired. Moreover, this problem is exacerbated when productivity is not easily measured and the dispreferred
group has some apparent shortcomings, such as lower-quality
education.
47. Orrin Hatch, Loading the Economy, 12 POLY. REv., Spring 1980, at 23, 31-32.
48. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 34-35.
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B. Discrimination in the Nonidealized Labor Market
The recent story of discrimination at the Shoney's restaurant
chain is instructive. The cofounder and longtime. chief executive officer of Shoney's, Ray Danner, was clearly a highly prejudiced individual.49 Several high-ranking Shoney's executives testified to the
effect that "Danner would say that no one would want to eat at a
restaurant where 'a bunch of niggers' were working."50 At one
point, Danner wrote a letter complaining about the perlormance of
one restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida, and noting that it had more
blacks - some of whom were subsequently fired - than other
fast-food restaurants that Danner had visited in the area.51 Indeed,
judging from Shoney's success with 1800 stores in thirty-six states,52
Danner's business instincts about what southern white customers
would want from a low-budget restaurant may, regrettably, not
have been without substance. In this instance the analysis would be
different from what Hatch and Epstein suggest: unrestrained
profit-maximizing firms would in fact avoid hiring blacks in positions where they could be seen by diners if that were the preference
of their customers. Indeed, the fact that Denny's and Wendy's restaurants have been charged with similar discriminatory conduct
may reveal that the tendencies toward efficiency in the labor market are not always the ally of black workers.
Moreover, Dann.er in all likelihood did not apply racist business
theories with the laserlike precision of a profit-maximizer - that is,
he did not shun blacks for visible positions to please the customers
but at the same time welcome them in jobs where the customers
would not see them. Only one out of sixty-eight division directors
and none of the higher-level 'corporate managers at Shoney's were
black.53 It would seem that"the hiring policies at Shoney's reflected
deference not only to the discriminatory attitudes of its customers
but also to those of its CEO and largest stockholder. But the market penalties for this behavior did not seem to be strong, and it was
only a huge settlement in excess of $100 million in damages coupled
with a substantial stock-price drop when Danner showed signs of
resisting the remedial measures designed to increase the ·number of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Steve Watkins, Racism Du lour at Shoney's, NATION, Oct. 18, 1993, at 424.
Id. at 427 (quoting Thomas Buckner, a former Shoney's division personnel director).
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
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black managerial employees that led to Danner's departure from
Shoney's.s4
A number of lessons emerge from the Shoney's case. No one
contended that the black workers that Danner did not want customers to see were less able. They were considered to be less valuable
because certain customers appeared to dislike seeing them. Thus,
the value that was being equated to price was not the intrinsic value
of these workers but their contingent value in light of racist customer preferences. It would not be surprising to learn that this apparently widespread racist attitude would depress the demand for
black labor. As a result, black wages would be lower than the
wages of otherwise identical white workers. This underscores the
difference between labor markets - in which prices are determined by supply and demand, with discriminatory attitudes of employers, fellow employees, and customers influencing the demand
- and capital markets - in which an arbitrage model of pricing is
appropriate and price will be determined only by the intrinsic value
of the asset.ss While the demand for stocks is perfectly elastic, no
study of labor demand has ever found it to be highly elastic, let
alone horizontal.S6
Moreover, the market penalty for the full array of Shoney's discriminatory practices, some of which enhanced and some of which
diminished profits, was not particularly powerful. Indeed, only the
intervention of antidiscrimination law established the costliness of
the racist policy, at which point the market did encourage the departure of a severely discriminatory owner. Although Danner's racist policy of not hiring visible black employees might have been
profit-maximizing to the extent it accorded with customer preference, his general antipathy to hiring any black supervisory workers
even in nonvisible positions would not be consistent with profit
54. Id.
55. As Stephen Ross has written,
If labor markets behaved like financial markets, the theories of finance would be used to
study them....

Paul Samuelson's textbook on economics has the following anonymous quote, "You
can make even a parrot into a learned political economist - all [it] must learn are the
two words 'supply' and 'demand'."
By contrast, the intuition of neoclassical finance is quite different ...• To make the
parrot into a learned financial economist, he only needs to learn the single word
"arbitrage."
Ross, supra note 30, at 29-30 (quoting PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 52 (11th ed.1980)).
56. See, e.g., Kim B. Clark & Richard B. Freeman, How Elastic ls the Demand for Labor?, 62 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 509, 518 (1980) (estimating the elasticity of demand for labor at
.4 or .5).
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maximization. Thus, although the market penalty for such nonprofit-maximizing discrimination did not seem to be capable of
driving Danner from the market, the introduction of a sizable legal
penalty enabled the market to achieve the desired social outcome.
It is precisely this mechanism that might render Title VII efficient,
as I have suggested elsewhere.57 But the important point here is
that the value of black workers to Shoney's was not simply based on
their intrinsic productivity but rather depended on the discriminatory tastes of customers and the employer. This is the distinction
between what the labor market achieves in terms of equating price
and contingent value and what would be achieved if the labor market functioned in the same fashion as the capital market.
IV.

THE GULF BETWEEN INTRINSIC EQUALITY AND
CONSTRUCTED EQUALITY

The preceding discussion has shown that equating price and
value means different things in the labor market and the capital
market and that the initial goal of employment discrimination law
was to give black and other protected workers the same intrinsic
equality that would be guaranteed if the labor market operated like
a capital market. This of course explains why some of the opponents of the statute do not feel it is needed. Because they believe
that the labor market operates identically to the capital market,
they see no need to have the costly and cumbersome law step in to
provide what the market already offers.
But, at least thus far, the antagonists have not made much headway on this battle. The law is solidly entrenched, and the public at
large seems to believe that protected workers are entitled to a legal
guarantee that their labor will be compensated in the same fashion
that it would be in a perfectly competitive and nondiscriminatory
market. But the battles over the proper scope of employment discrimination law are not limited to debates over whether the appropriate compensation for blacks is determined by the contingent
equality between price and value guaranteed in a labor market or
by the intrinsic equality that the capital market can provide. A second front has opened between those who are satisfied with the goal
of attaining intrinsic equality and those who feel that the law should
go further than an idealized, perfectly competitive market might
conceivably go. Those who find intrinsic equality to be insufficient
57. See John J. Donohue III, ls Title Vll Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); John
J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to
Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523 (1987).
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believe that a higher level of what I call "constructed equality"
should be the aim of the law. Interestingly, while the first success in
the law of employment discrimination was the acknowledgement, if
not the attainment, of the right to intrinsic equality, over time this
demand for equality has come to be overshadowed in much the
same way that the early demands of blacks for the equal protection
of the laws subsequently came to be seen as wholly inadequate.

A. The Evolving Conception of Equality
In this regard, consider the NAACP's thirty-year battle designed
to achieve racial equality through law58 - probably the most famous sustained litigative effort to achieve equality in our nation's
history. The NAACP consciously adopted a two-step strategy in an
effort to achieve the equal protection of law for black Americans.
First, the NAACP relied on the equality component of the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson59 in its pursuit of improvements in the treatment of blacks. Given the severity and
pernicious character of racial injustice in America over the period
from the early 1920s through the early 1950s, this protracted phase
of the NAACP's legal attack might seem to have been completely
ineffective. In fact, this period was one of substantial progress in
black southern education as measured by the convergence toward
equality in "measured schooling inputs," such as the wages paid to
black teachers, the length of the school year for black pupils, and
the pupil-teacher ratios for black students.60 Despite the fact that
southern blacks were without significant electoral power over this
period, the NAACP's struggle to achieve equal, albeit separate,
schooling for blacks seems to have generated considerable improvements in virtually all C?tegories of educational quality inputs. By
the early 1950s, when this first phase of the litigation strategy was
ending, most southern states had nearly equalized these inputs for
black and white students.61
Having achieved this degree of racial equality, the NAACP then
switched to its second phase of the legal strategy by attacking the
58. See MARK TusHNET,_THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDU·
CATION 1925-1950 (1987); see also Cass R. Sunstein, How Independent is the Court?, N.Y.
REV. BooKs, Oct. 22, 1992, at 47 (reviewing W1LL1AM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS:
THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHN·
SON (1992), and GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991)).
59. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
60. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, School Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings: A Direct Assessment, 107 QJ. EcoN. 151, 167 (1992).
61. Id. at 168.
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constitutionality of the doctrine of "separate but equal" itself. Interestingly, the NAACP sought to achieve equality, first by using
the existing legal framework to push for what the law had grudgingly allowed at the level of constitutional doctrine but not in practice, and then by forcing the law to grant much more. Certainly, the
relative gains in black education in the segregat,ed South prior to
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education62 were dramatic and
represented significant movements in the direction of equality. Yet
only by thinking of equality as something more than the formalistic
achievement of equal measured educational inputs was the
Supreme Court able to advance racial equality in a much more
profound way than would have been possible under the doctrine of
legal segregation.
·
The quest for equality in labor markets has undergone a similar
metamorphosis. First, the civil rights movement sought to achieve
what the market had yet to offer to black Americans - wages
equal to the true value of their labor in a nondiscriminatory environment. This aspect of the civil rights movement was virtually a
complete success, at least at the doctrinal and aspirational levels.
At one point the idea that the government could coerce private employers to hire individuals that they did not wish to have ,as employees had little widespread support; today there is a staunch
consensus that such coercion is appropriate to guarantee to protected workers what they would secure in a nondiscriminatory free
market. Indeed, this consensus has become so dominant that one
scholar has opined that it is virtually "forbidden" to question it.63
As the goal of eradicating the appalling mistreatment of black
Americans provided ihe battering ram against the doctrine of freedom of contract in employment, other disadvantaged groups - initially women and then the elderly and the disabled - attached
themselves to this quest for legal equality in the workplace. Once
this initial version ofequality became widely accepted, the demands
for a more aggressive employment discrimination policy began to
grow.
In the same way that the doctrine of "separate but equal" came
to be seen as the embodiment of inequality - even though for decades it was the basis of a legal strategy to advance the status of
blacks - the initial phase of employment discrimination law that
tried to confer what a perfectly competitive market would provide
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. See

EPSTEIN,

supra note 16, at xii-xiii.
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has come to be seen by many as a stunted form of equality that
represents an impediment to needed change. These claims to go
beyond the protections of an idealized market are seen in the argument that the special burdens of childbirth and childrearing require
preferential treatment of female employees. 64 Women are not to
be given only what a pure profit-maximizing, nonmisogynistic employer would offer them; instead they should receive what the modem conception of gender equality demands.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act65 emerged in 1967
from the combined support of those who sought to guarantee the
intrinsic notion of equality - that is, what a non-ageist, idealized
free market would yield to workers who were over the age of forty
- and those who thought older workers needed to be protected
from the market.66 The latter group was uncomfortable with the
relentless logic of disregarding the surface attributes of race, color,
religion, sex, or age and focusing exclusively on those traits purely
related to productivity. In their opinion, the single-minded focus on
worker productivity, which is the very essence of the intrinsic notion of equality, could itself be the enemy of female and older
workers.
The requirement that employers shift their focus away from
what an idealized market would offer to what fairness requires was
taken a step further with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 67 Like the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act before it, the ADA incqrporates a component of the market
protection conception of antidiscrimination in that it prohibits em64. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
201, 244 (arguing for statutes guaranteeing pregnant workers their jobs during pregnancy.
related disability as a solution to existing workplace practices "structured with the expectation that workers would not be new mothers"); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the
Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 804, 833-34 (1990).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988).
66. The Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress under Section 715 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 - U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AoE Dts.
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) - is very explicitly concerned with statistical discrimination leading to employment bans against the hiring of older workers. It found that
"[a]pproximately half of all job openings which develop in the private economy each year are
closed to applicants over 55 years of age" by virtue of firms setting specific age limits beyond
which they will not consider a worker for a vacant job regardless of ability. Id. at 6. Because
the presence of statistical discrimination implies that individual workers are not being paid
their true value, the concern over statistical discrimination against the elderly reflected a
demand for intrinsic equality for these workers.
Conversely, while the market presumably penalizes those who are purely ageist - that is,
irrationally biased against older workers - it rewards those who successfully reduce costs by
not hiring older workers. This is an explicit concern discussed in the Secretary of Labor's
report. See id. at 15-17.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 1991).
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ployers from irrationally discriminating on the basis of a disability.
A disabled worker who can perform the essential functions of a job
may not be rejected because of an employer's irrational aversion to
the worker's disability. This conforms precisely to the intrinsic notion of equality - workers should receive what they would get in a
nondiscriminatory free market. But, at the same time, the ADA is
not content with this notion of equality. The Act goes much further
by requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations that
would enable disabled workers to perform adequately on the job.68
Clearly, given a choice between two equally productive workers,
one requiring the expenditure of significant sums in order to accommodate him and one requiring no such expenditures, the profitmaximizing firm would prefer the worker who is less costly to hire.
Thus, the transformation that has occurred in the realm of civil
rights is that the ideal nondiscriminatory market solution, which
previously was both the benchmark of intrinsic equality and what
the law demanded, is now regarded as the obstacle to social justice.

B. The Tripartite Equality Frameworks
The framework of contingent, intrinsic, and constructed equality
offers insights into some of the major issues of employment discrimination law. For example, some have argued that the Supreme
Court's creation of the disparate impact doctrine represented a departure from the congressional intent to prohibit only intentional
discrimination.69 The claim is that the disparate impact standard
represents an unwarranted shift in Title VII's purpose from guaranteeing equality of opportunity to ensuring equality of result. But
the move to a disparate impact standard, which was ultimately endorsed by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is consistent
with the goal of trying to guarantee intrinsic equality. Neutral rules
that adversely affect protected workers without being tightly tied to
their productivity are obstacles to the attainment of intrinsic equality, because the use of such neutral rules reflects the existence of
statistical discrimination. As we saw above, intrinsic equality,
which is defined by what would exist in a market that was as per-

68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111(9), 12,112(b)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
69. See, e.g., Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 !Nous. REL. LJ. 429 (1985).
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fectly competitive as the capital market, cannot coincide with statistical discrimination.10
In addition, the tripartite equality framework can also be used
to focus discussion concerning the likely success of various legal interventions. Intrinsic equality will necessarily be easier to generate
than constructed equality because the pressures of the market at
least push in the direction of intrinsic equality, but they steadfastly
resist the attainment of constructed equality. This is not to say that
the attainment of intrinsic equality is relentlessly encouraged by the
market. For example, pure market forces do not encourage the hiring of groups that are disfavored by the employer, fellow employees, or customers, nor do they dictate the disregard of low-cost
statistical proxies that generate a reasonably productive work force.
Still, if workers could be properly sorted throughout the economy, a
market equilibrium could exist in which every worker was being
paid precisely his or her intrinsic value.71 This could not happen
with respect to constructed equality, because any employer who
was paying a worker more than the worker's intrinsic value would
find it advantageous to replace the worker.72 This implies that intrinsic equality is at least in theory a goal that is attainable for all
workers. Conversely, ambitious efforts to extend the enlarged demands of constructed equality to a growing array of protected
workers moves society away from a conceptually attainable goal to
an amorphous objective, which can only be defined through wrangling among conflicting interests in the political process. This fact
in no way undermines the desirability of certain objectives, but it
does suggest that political power may play a greater role than principled discourse in determining the future contours of constructed
equality.

70. In efficient capital markets there is no statistical discrimination because it is always
profitable to spend the resources to ascertain the value of individual financial securities. In
labor markets it is frequently not profitable to ascertain the true value of individual workers.
71. Another way of expressing this point is that the labor market, in equilibrium, generates contingent equality, and within the set of contingently equal outcomes are a subset of
intrinsically equal outcomes that would be unlikely to be generated in a labor market but that
could be maintained in equilibrium if they were somehow attained.
72. One might qualify this point by stating that if the employer expenditures that were
necessary to accommodate, say, a disabled worker, have already been paid - that is, they
are sunk costs - then the position of constructed equality could be a stable equilibrium,
even though it would not be one that would be generated by a labor market. If the costs of
accommodation are continuing, however, the pure market incentive would be to replace the
disabled worker with an equally productive worker who imposed no burden of
accommodation.
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CONCLUSION

In the two decades following World War II, the desire to find a
remedy for the egregious misconduct directed toward American
blacks coalesced into· a belief that because contingent equality the best that the labor market could supply - was insufficient, the
government must intervene to supply the greater intrinsic equality
that would be generated by a more perfectly competitive market.
The passage of Title VII would not have been possible without the
conceptual and political shift that allowed a majority of the public
to embrace the view that federal regulation of employment was
needed to correct the injustice being visited upon black Americans.
In the late days of the debate over Title VII, women succeeded in
becoming one of the protected categories that benefited from this
conceptual and political development.73 At the same time, concerns about discriinination against the elderly emerged, leading to a
provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 calling for the Secretary of
Labor to study and report to Congress on the problem of age discrimination.74 The elderly followed in this quest for intrinsic equality with the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
designed to achieve what the imperfections of the labor market rendered unattainable without intervention. Even the early stages of
affirmative action represented an attempt to move the employment
of blacks to the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive
market. But whereas employment discrimination law first used the
notion of the market to advance the status of protected workers, it
then rejected it, in much the same way that the NAACP litigative
strategy at first relied upon the doctrine of separate but equal to
advance black welfare but ultimately rejected that same doctrine.
Primarily through litigative efforts on behalf of female and elderly employees, the courts began to broaden the notion of equality
beyond what a perfect market could give to what a perfect market
would negate. Advocates of affirmative action began not only to
seek the idealized market solution but to push for broader social
justice. In this vision of constructed equality, the dictates of law are
defined no longer through some abstract market paradigm but
rather through considering what steps would be necessary to define
a fair society. Releasing the law and its goals from the theoretical
confines of a market paradigm has the advantage of freeing it to
73. See John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1337-38 (1989).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1988).
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promote a more refined notion of justice, especially in light of the
nonmarket roles of women as childbearers and caretakers, than
would otherwise have been possible. On the other hand, freed
from the theoretical mooring that the market paradigm provided,
the malleable claims for constructed equality began to proliferate in
ways that have weakened the moral force of antidiscrimination law.
Employment discrimination law began to provide avenues for windfall gains rather than opportunities for promoting corrective justice,
and the moral imperative that impelled the civil rights movement
has been blunted to the extent that employment discrimination protections have been extended by special interest legislation to
groups, such as smokers, with little to commend their legislative demands other than the political power of tobacco companies.
The ADA has imposed perhaps the greatest demands of constructed equality by explicitly requiring that employers take reasonable measures to make the disabled equal. Rather than the early
Title VII insistence that employers disregard the traits of protected
workers, the ADA requires employers to identify the traits of the
disabled that undermine their productivity and to seek whenever
possible to overcome these traits. The ADA has paved the way for
the possibility that economically disadvantaged minorities such as
blacks, whose position as the central focus of employment discrimination law has gradually diminished, will employ the ADA's rationale to argue that the effects of the factors that have undermined
their productivity - including very poor schooling and broken
families - are now to be corrected by employers. Although the
conceptual groundwork for this step has been laid, the fracturing of
the consensus forged by the civil rights movement may render this
next step unattainable in the current political environment.

